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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge: 
 
Albert Sally appeals his sentence for convictions on drug 
charges stemming from participation in a multi-member 
crack conspiracy. Sally argues that the district court erred 
by failing to depart downward from the guideline range 
under Section 5H1.1 of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines because of his youth when he committed the 
offense and evidence of his subsequent maturation. We find 
no error in the district court's refusal to depart under 
§ 5H1.1. However, in light of the recent decisions in Koon v. 
United States, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 2035 (1996), and 
United States v. Brock, 108 F.3d 31 (4th Cir. 1997), we will 
vacate Sally's sentence and remand the cause to the district 
court for it to determine whether Sally is entitled to a 





Albert Sally was a bagger and look-out for a crack 
conspiracy from August 1988 through February 1989. He 
was seventeen years old when he became involved in the 
conspiracy and he turned eighteen on November 2, 1988, 
some three and one-half months before the conspiracy 
ended. As a result of his participation in the conspiracy, 
Sally was indicted and convicted of drug charges as well as 
charges related to the use of a gun in drug trafficking. He 
was sentenced on December 17, 1991. 
 
More than five years later, on June 24, 1996, Sally's 
convictions for using a gun during drug trafficking were 
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dismissed pursuant to a § 2255 motion. As a consequence, 
his sentence was vacated and a resentencing hearing held 
on September 24, 1996. At the hearing, Sally's counsel 
requested that the district court consider a downward 
departure based on a combination of two factors: (1) the 
fact that Sally was seventeen years old during half the time 
he participated in the conspiracy; and (2) the fact that since 
he was first jailed, Sally had demonstrated increased 
maturity by earning a GED and an additional nine college 
credits. These factors, Sally's counsel argued, presented 
sufficiently "unusual circumstances" to permit the court to 
depart downward, notwithstanding the Guidelines' ordinary 
prohibition against considering age as a factor in deciding 
to depart from the Guidelines. 
 
The district court rejected Sally's request for a downward 
departure, reasoning as follows: 
 
I expressly conclude in the circumstances of this case 
I do not have the authority to depart downward . . .. 
My present conclusion is given the Guideline 
requirement [that] ordinarily age is not a factor for a 
downward departure I don't think I can find in this 
case it is sufficiently extraordinary to permit me to do 
it. Therefore, I would conclude I lack the authority to 
do it. If I had the authority to do it, I would seriously 
consider a downward departure still further not 
because I think the sentence originally imposed was 
incorrect but as sort of a reward to the Defendant for 
having made valiant efforts to turn his life around 
during the time he has been in jail. 
 
The district court then proceeded to sentence Sally to 168 
months, which was the lowest sentence available in Sally's 




On appeal, Sally presents two arguments. First, he 
asserts that the district court incorrectly concluded that it 
lacked the discretion to grant a downward departure under 
§ 5H1.1 based on his age. Second, he contends that the 
facts of his case are extraordinary enough to warrant using 
his age as a factor to support a downward departure. 
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Before oral argument, we asked the parties to address a 
third issue: namely, whether post-conviction rehabilitation 
is an appropriate basis for a downward departure. 
 
We review the question of whether the district court had 
the authority to depart downward based on the factor of 
age under an abuse of discretion standard. See United 
States v. Romualdi, 101 F.3d 971, 973 (3d Cir. 1996) ("[A] 
district court by definition abuses its discretion when it 
makes an error of law." ) (quoting Koon, 116 S.Ct. at 2047). 
In contrast, we lack jurisdiction to review a refusal to 
depart downward "when the district court, knowing it may 
do so, nonetheless determines that departure is not 
warranted." United States v. McQuilkin, 97 F.3d 723, 729 




In § 5H1.1, the Sentencing Commission has foreclosed 
departures based on age in all but the most extraordinary 
cases. The section states in pertinent part: 
 
Age (including youth) is not ordinarily relevant in 
determining whether a sentence should be outside the 
applicable guideline range. Age may be a reason to 
impose a sentence below the applicable guideline range 
when the defendant is elderly and infirm and where a 
form of punishment such as home confinement might 
be equally efficient as and less costly than 
incarceration. 
 
We have held previously that § 5H1.1 prohibits departures 
based on age "except in extraordinary circumstances." 
United States v. Shoupe, 929 F.2d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 1991); 
accord United States v. Higgins, 967 F.2d 841, 845-46 (3d 
Cir. 1992) ("The language of the guideline policy statements 
indicates that only when any one of [the factors not 
`ordinarily relevant'] can be characterized as extraordinary 
does the district court have discretion to depart from the 
guideline's sentencing range."). These precedents are 
consistent with the approach established in the Guidelines 
themselves: 
 
An offender characteristic or other circumstance that is 
not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a 
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sentence should be outside the applicable guideline 
range may be relevant to this determination if such 
characteristic or circumstance is present to an unusual 
degree and distinguishes the case from the "heartland" 
cases covered by the guidelines in a way that is 
important to the statutory purposes of sentencing. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (emphasis added). However, as the 
Commentary to § 5K2.0 stresses, "In the absence of a 
characteristic or circumstance that distinguishes a case as 
sufficiently atypical to warrant a sentence different from 
that called for under the guidelines, a sentence outside the 
guideline range is not authorized." Moreover, it is 
anticipated that cases where extraordinary circumstances 
warrant a sentence outside the guideline range "will be 
extremely rare." U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, comment. 
 
Sally concedes all this, but contends that the district 
court did not know that it had the authority to depart 
based on his age. In support of this assertion, Sally points 
to a statement made by the district court at the 
resentencing hearing: "If I had the authority to do it, I 
would seriously consider a downward departure . . . ." This 
statement, however, must be read in the context of the 
statement that directly preceded it: "My present conclusion 
is given the Guideline requirement [that] ordinarily age is 
not a factor for a downward departure I don't think I can 
find in this case it is sufficiently extraordinary to permit me 
to [depart downward]." (Emphasis added). Indeed, read in 
their entirety, the district court's comments demonstrate 
that it clearly understood its authority to depart downward 
under § 5H1.1 -- the court could depart downward only if 
it believed Sally's age to be a "sufficiently extraordinary" 
factor warranting departure under the facts of the case. 
However, as the district court explicitly stated for the 
record, it could not find that the facts of Sally's case were 
so "sufficiently extraordinary" as to permit his age to be 
used as a factor supporting a downward departure. Simply 
stated, the district court applied the proper legal standards 
under § 5H1.1 and hence, we find no error here. 
 
Sally's second argument is equally unavailing. He 
contends that if age is ever to be used as a factor 
supporting a downward departure, then it should be used 
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under the facts of this case. As noted earlier, however, we 
do not have jurisdiction to review Sally's claim that the 
unusual facts of his case warrant a downward departure 
based on age. See McQuilkin, 97 F.3d at 729; accord United 
States v. Evans, 49 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[A] 
discretionary decision by the trial judge that a departure is 
not justified is not reviewable."). Indeed, having satisfied 
ourselves that the district court applied the proper legal 
standards under § 5H1.1 and fully understood the scope of 
its discretion to depart from the Guidelines on the basis of 
Sally's age, we cannot hear a challenge to the merits of the 
district court's discretionary decision not to depart from the 
Guidelines. McQuilkin, 97 F.3d at 729. Accordingly, we will 
not review the district court's valid exercise of its discretion 





In addition to Sally's arguments alleging error in the 
district court's application of § 5H1.1, we asked the parties 
to address the question of whether post-conviction 
rehabilitation is an appropriate basis for a downward 
departure. At oral argument, both sides agreed that in light 
of the decision in Brock, and the analysis of Koon therein, 
reliance on post-offense rehabilitation efforts as a factor 
warranting a downward departure was indeed proper. 
Moreover, both parties also agreed that based on the 
comments of the judge at the resentencing hearing, it was 
clear that the district court believed that it lacked the 
authority to depart downward based on Sally's post- 
conviction rehabilitation efforts. We have not previously 
considered whether post-conviction rehabilitation efforts 
may serve as a basis for a downward departure from the 
Guidelines. We reach that question today and conclude 
that they may. 
 
We begin our analysis with the decision in Brock. Brock 
pleaded guilty to two counts of credit card fraud. The 
district court, despite expressing a desire to depart 
downward, refused the defendant's request for a downward 
departure based upon his post-offense rehabilitation efforts 
because it believed it lacked the authority to depart based 
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on an earlier Fourth Circuit precedent. 108 F.3d at 32-33. 
On appeal, the Brock court vacated the defendant's 
sentence, holding that "extraordinary or exceptional efforts 
at rehabilitation could possibly constitute a proper basis for 
consideration of a downward departure." Id. at 32. 
 
In reaching its decision, the Brock court relied on the 
Supreme Court's opinion in Koon, which it read as support 
for the conclusion that the factor of "post-offense 
rehabilitation" had not been forbidden by the Sentencing 
Commission as a basis for departure under the appropriate 
circumstances. Id. at 33-34. Since post-offense 
rehabilitation was not a forbidden factor, the Brock court 
next sought to fit the factor into one of the other categories 
identified in Koon: (1) the factor was encouraged by the 
Commission as a basis for departure and was either (a) 
taken into account in the applicable guideline itself or (b) 
not taken into account in the guideline; (2) the factor was 
discouraged by the Commission as a basis for departure; or 
(3) the factor was unmentioned by the Commission. Id. at 
34 (citing Koon, 116 S.Ct. at 2045). Ascertaining which 
category the post-offense rehabilitation factor occupied was 
important, the court noted, because "Koon instructs that 
different inquiries are germane depending upon which of 
these categories a factor falls into." Id. As the court 
proceeded to explain the Koon framework: 
 
If a factor is one upon which the Commission 
encourages departure, and it is not taken into account 
by the applicable guideline, a court may exercise its 
discretion and depart on that basis. If an encouraged 
factor is taken into account in the applicable guideline, 
or if a factor is a discouraged one, then departure is 
permissible only if the factor is present to an 
exceptional degree or in some other way makes the 
case different from the ordinary case where the factor 
is present. Similarly, if a factor is neither encouraged 
nor discouraged, but listed by the Commission as one 
appropriately considered in applying an adjustment to 
the guidelines, a court may depart only if the factor is 
present to such an exceptional or extraordinary degree 
that it removes the case from the heartland of 
situations to which the guideline was fashioned to 
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apply. Finally, if a factor is one that is unmentioned by 
the guidelines, a court must, taking into consideration 
the structure and theory of both relevant individual 
guidelines and the guidelines taken as a whole, 
determine whether the circumstances presented are 
sufficient to remove the case from the heartland of the 
applicable guideline. 
 
Id. at 34-35 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 
Adopting the reasoning of an earlier Fourth Circuit case, 
the Brock court concluded that the Guidelines had already 
taken into account the factor of post-offense rehabilitation 
because the commentary to the Guidelines expressly 
instructed that such efforts be considered in determining a 
defendant's eligibility for an acceptance of responsibility 
adjustment pursuant to § 3E1.1. Id. at 35; see also 
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 Application Note 1(g). Therefore, the court 
concluded, a departure based on post-offense rehabilitation 
was warranted where the factor is "present to such an 
exceptional degree that the situation cannot be considered 
typical of those circumstances in which an acceptance of 
responsibility adjustment is granted." 108 F.3d at 35. Thus, 
the Brock court remanded the cause to the district court "to 
set forth specific factual findings concerning what efforts on 
Brock's part it considered exceptional enough to make the 
case atypical of those situations in which the acceptance of 
responsibility adjustment usually applies based on post- 
offense rehabilitation." Id. at 35 n.2. 
 
We agree with the Brock court's reasoning and find its 
analysis and application of Koon persuasive. We hold that 
post-offense rehabilitation efforts, including those which 
occur post-conviction, may constitute a sufficient factor 
warranting a downward departure provided that the efforts 
are so exceptional as to remove the particular case from the 
heartland in which the acceptance of responsibility 
guideline was intended to apply. Indeed, we find no reason 
to distinguish between post-offense and post-conviction 
rehabilitation efforts in this context -- post-conviction 
rehabilitation efforts are, by definition, post-offense 
rehabilitation efforts and hence should be subject to at 
least equivalent treatment under the Guidelines. 
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We find additional support for our conclusion in our own 
cases. We have already held that "a sentencing court may 
depart downward when the circumstances of a case 
demonstrate a degree of acceptance of responsibility that is 
substantially in excess of that ordinarily present." United 
States v. Lieberman, 971 F.2d 989, 996 (3d Cir. 1992). 
Moreover, we recently reaffirmed this holding in Evans, 49 
F.3d at 114, where we noted that "courts have recognized 
that a defendant's ameliorative post-arrest conduct may 
justify a departure even though section 3E1.1 rewards 
acceptance of responsibility." (citing Lieberman, 971 F.2d at 
996) (internal quotations omitted). Collectively, these 
decisions clearly establish that when an offender 
demonstrates an exceptional or extraordinary degree of 
responsibility, a court may depart downward. In our view, 
post-offense or post-conviction rehabilitation efforts are 
factors that fall squarely within the scope of § 3E1.1 and 
thus exceptional or extraordinary examples of rehabilitation 
efforts may well warrant a downward departure.1 
 
In this case, there is no doubt that the district court 
believed that it lacked the legal authority to depart 
downward based on Sally's post-conviction rehabilitation 
efforts. Indeed, as the district judge explicitly stated at 
Sally's resentencing hearing: 
 
If I had the authority to do it, I would seriously 
consider a downward departure still further not 
because I think the sentence originally imposed was 
incorrect but as sort of a reward to the Defendant for 
having made valiant efforts to turn his life around 
during the time he has been in jail. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In United States v. Pharr, 916 F.2d 129, 131 (3d Cir. 1990), we stated 
that "[s]elf-improvement is not the type of conduct contemplated by the 
acceptance of responsibility provisions of the guidelines." Since this 
decision, however, §3E1.1 has been amended specifically to include 
"post-offense rehabilitative efforts (e.g., counseling or drug treatment)," 
as an appropriate consideration in determining whether a defendant 
qualifies for an adjustment under the acceptance of responsibility 
guideline. See U.S.S.G. §3E1.1 Application Note 1(g). Therefore, it is now 
clear that post-offense and post-conviction rehabilitation efforts are 
factors taken into account by the acceptance of responsibility provision 
of the Guidelines. 
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Given this clear expression of the district court's 
willingness to consider a downward departure based on 
Sally's post-conviction rehabilitation efforts, as well as the 
government's concession at oral argument that the district 
judge erroneously believed he lacked the authority to depart 
downward based on this factor, we conclude that Sally's 
sentence should be vacated and the cause remanded to the 
district court for resentencing. On remand, the district 
court must determine whether Sally's post-conviction 
rehabilitation efforts are remarkable and indicate real, 
positive behavorial change. In reaching this decision, the 
district court should set forth specific findings concerning 
what post-conviction rehabilitation efforts Sally has made 
that demonstrate a degree of acceptance of responsibility 
expressed by post-offense rehabilitation that is 
substantially in excess of that ordinarily present. 
 
Mindful of the Supreme Court's teaching that "[a] district 
court's decision to depart from the Guidelines . . . will in 
most cases be due substantial deference, for it embodies 
the traditional exercise of discretion by a sentencing court," 
Koon, 116 S.Ct. at 2046, we are reluctant to announce any 
general principles regarding what post-conviction 
rehabilitation efforts may be considered so extraordinary or 
exceptional as to warrant a downward departure. Indeed, 
based on the sentencing court's "institutional advantage 
over appellate courts in making these sorts of 
determinations," id. at 2047, we think it advisable to leave 
sentencing courts to make these determinations on a case- 
by-case basis, relying on the particular facts and 
circumstances of each case in weighing whether a 
particular defendant's post-conviction rehabilitation efforts 
warrant a downward departure. Nonetheless, we do believe 
that, at a minimum, there must be evidence demonstrating 
that a defendant has made concrete gains toward "turning 
his life around" before a sentencing court may properly rely 
on extraordinary post-conviction rehabilitation efforts as a 
basis for a downward departure. Unlike the usual 
adjustment for acceptance of responsibility where 
defendants may all-too-often be tempted to feign remorse 
for their crimes and be rewarded for it, we view the 
opportunity for downward departures based on 
extraordinary or exceptional post-conviction rehabilitation 
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efforts as a chance for truly repentant defendants to earn 
reductions in their sentences based on a demonstrated 
commitment to repair and to rebuild their lives. As such, 
we conclude that, as a baseline, downward departures 
based on extraordinary or exceptional post-conviction 
rehabilitation efforts are proper provided that the 
sentencing court makes factual findings demonstrating that 
the defendant has achieved real gains in rehabilitating 




In summary, we conclude that the district court has the 
authority to depart downward based on extraordinary or 
exceptional post-conviction rehabilitation efforts. 
Accordingly, we will vacate Sally's sentence and remand the 
cause to the district court for it to determine whether 
Sally's post-conviction rehabilitation efforts qualify him for 
a downward departure. 
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